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THE CENTRE FOR TAX SYSTEM INTEGRITY 
WORKING PAPERS 
 
 
The Centre for Tax System Integrity (CTSI) is a specialised research unit set up as a 
partnership between the Australian National University (ANU) and the Australian Taxation 
Office (Tax Office) to extend our understanding of how and why cooperation and 
contestation occur within the tax system.  
 
This series of working papers is designed to bring the research of the Centre for Tax System 
Integrity to as wide an audience as possible and to promote discussion among researchers, 
academics and practitioners both nationally and internationally on taxation compliance. 
 
The working papers are selected with three criteria in mind: (1) to share knowledge, 
experience and preliminary findings from research projects; (2) to provide an outlet for 
policy focused research and discussion papers; and (3) to give ready access to previews of 
papers destined for publication in academic journals, edited collections, or research 
monographs. 
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Abstract 
 
During the 1990s, the number of Australian taxpayers involved in aggressive tax planning 
more than doubled. This aggressive form of financial planning poses a serious threat to the 
integrity of Australia’s tax system. In order to deal with the problem, the Australian 
Taxation Office (Tax Office) announced in 1998 that they would be implementing a 
number of initiatives aimed at combating aggressive tax planning. Part of the Tax Office’s 
crackdown on aggressive tax planning involved issuing amended assessments to the 42 000 
Australians who invested in mass marketed tax schemes. The majority of scheme investors, 
however, resisted the Tax Office’s attempts to recover scheme related tax debts. This paper 
discusses the findings of an empirical study that shows that the widespread resistance 
exhibited by scheme investors was due partly to the manner in which the Tax Office dealt 
with the schemes issue. Using survey data collected from 2301 tax scheme investors, and 
2040 taxpayers from the general population, it will be shown that those who invested in tax 
schemes are more disillusioned with the tax system, are more hostile and resistant towards 
the Tax Office, and are more likely to resent paying tax as a result. Suggestions for the way 
regulatory authorities such as the Tax Office should deal with non-compliers, and possible 
solutions for how tax authorities might deal with the increasing problem of aggressive tax 
planning, will be discussed. 
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An examination of taxpayers’ attitudes towards the Australian tax system: Findings 
from a survey of tax scheme investors 
 
Kristina Murphy 
 
Introduction 
 
In an ideal world, all taxpayers would voluntarily pay their taxes and comply with all of 
their tax obligations willingly. But let’s face it, no one enjoys paying tax, and at the end of 
each financial year some people’s thoughts turn to how they can best arrange their affairs 
to pay as little tax as possible. This may simply involve making use of strategies that allow 
one to legally minimise tax (for example, increasing superannuation contributions or 
negative gearing an investment property). These strategies are what the Australian 
Taxation Office (Tax Office) would consider to be non-aggressive tax planning strategies. 
Alternatively, however, there are strategies that may involve non-compliant or fraudulent 
activity that could be most appropriately described as tax evasion (for example, creating 
false expenses or shifting money offshore). There is also a third type of strategy used by 
some taxpayers that falls somewhere between these two extremes. These are the tax 
avoidance strategies that the Tax Office commonly refers to as aggressive tax planning 
strategies. They are ‘aggressive’ as they seek to exploit deficiencies or uncertainty in the 
law (Australian Taxation Office, 1999, pxiii). Aggressive tax planning by its very nature 
involves finding ways to accomplish compliance with the letter of the law while totally 
undermining the policy intent or spirit behind the words.  
 
Aggressive tax planning used to be a secret, well kept by high priced tax lawyers and 
accountants and, as a result, used to be primarily reserved for the very wealthy. In recent 
years, however, thousands of ‘ordinary’ Australians have been cashing in on this new form 
of financial planning (Australian Taxation Office, 2000). For example, during the 1990s, 
an estimated $4 billion in tax revenue was lost as a result of 42 000 Australians claiming 
deductions for their involvement in aggressive mass marketed tax schemes. Scheme related 
tax deductions were found to increase from $54 million in 1994 to over $1 billion in 1998 
(Murphy, 2002a). These figures highlight the threat apparent to the tax base, especially 
when one considers that mass marketed tax schemes are not the only form of aggressive 
tax planning available to taxpayers. A multitude of strategies that seek to exploit 
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deficiencies in the law are continuously being devised each year in the Australian market 
place (Braithwaite, in press). This has been coupled with an increased number of taxpayers 
taking advantage of their tax ‘benefits’ each year. There is therefore no doubt that 
aggressive tax planning poses a serious threat to the integrity of the Australian tax system. 
 
Explaining non-compliance: Deterrence or attitudes? 
 
Understanding why taxpayers do not comply with their tax obligations is a topic of interest 
to most revenue authorities around the world. Much of the early research that has 
examined tax compliance behaviour and taxpayers’ tendencies to evade or avoid tax has 
used a deterrence theory framework to explain their behaviour (for reviews see Jackson & 
Milliron, 1986; Roth, Scholz & Witte, 1989). Deterrence theories are rooted in economics 
and portray people as ‘amoral profit-seekers whose actions are motivated wholly by 
rational calculation of costs and opportunities’ (Kagan & Scholz, 1984, p. 69; see also 
Kirchler & Maciejovsky, 2001). According to the deterrence view, people carefully assess 
opportunities and risks, and disobey the law when the anticipated fine and probability of 
being caught are small in relation to the profits to be made through non-compliance (for a 
discussion see Kagan & Scholz, 1984).  
 
It was in the late 1960s that researchers became particularly interested in the effects of 
deterrence on compliance with laws. A number of researchers reported inverse 
relationships between the threat of legal punishment and the volume of crime (Gibbs, 
1968; Jensen, 1969; Tittle, 1969). Both Gibbs (1968) and Tittle (1969) reported evidence 
of a relationship between the certainty of legal sanctions and crime rates, and Jensen 
(1969) reported evidence of a relationship between perceived risk of legal sanctions and 
self-reported delinquency in juveniles. These findings were taken by some to suggest that 
individuals will only comply with rules and regulations when confronted with harsh 
sanctions and penalties.  
 
Deterrence research conducted in the tax arena has continued to reveal conflicting results. 
While there is some evidence to suggest that fear of detection acts as a deterrent to tax non-
compliance (Witte & Woodbury, 1985; Slemrod, Blumenthal & Christian, 2001), there is 
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little evidence to suggest that the severity of penalties or prosecuting taxpayers deters non-
compliance in the long-term (Kinsey, 1988; Witte & Woodbury, 1985; Williams, 2001). 
An Australian study, for example, showed that levels of tax non-compliance between 1985 
and 1996 were not influenced by the increased severity of statutory fines or by the 
increased number of jail terms being handed out to tax offenders over this time (Devos, 
2002). Another Australian study showed that prosecuting non-compliant taxpayers also 
had a limited effect on influencing their long-term compliance behaviour (Williams, 2001).  
 
A limitation of the deterrence model, therefore, is that it does not satisfactorily explain the 
high levels of voluntary compliance observed in many situations. The tax system in 
Australia is based largely on self-assessment and voluntary compliance by taxpayers. The 
probability of receiving an audit by the Tax Office is considerably low. The chance of 
being caught blatantly avoiding or evading tax is also unlikely, and if a taxpayer is caught, 
the culpability penalties are relatively minor. Yet the majority of taxpayers still comply 
with their obligations and pay their tax with good will (Braithwaite, 2003). In fact, there is 
now a growing amount of empirical evidence to suggest that an appeal to a taxpayer’s 
conscience can have a greater effect on their subsequent compliance behaviour than the 
threat of legal sanctions (for example, Schwartz & Orleans, 1967; Grasmick & Scott, 1982; 
Hite, 1997; Wenzel, 2001). 
 
It is for these reasons that many tax researchers have questioned the deterrence theory 
framework as the most appropriate model for explaining taxpayer behaviour. These 
researchers, instead, suggest that taxpayer attitudes towards the tax system and paying tax 
need to be incorporated into theoretical accounts of non-compliance. A number of 
investigations of attitudes toward, and beliefs about, taxation and its evasion have now 
been undertaken (for recent studies in the Australian context see Braithwaite, Reinhart, 
Mearns & Graham, 2001; Wallschutzky, 1984; 1986; Wearing & Headey, 1997; Wenzel, 
Murphy, Ahmed & Mearns, 2003). The findings of these studies suggest that taxpayer 
attitudes towards the tax system, and the way taxpayers feel treated by a tax authority are 
important in explaining taxpayer non-compliance (for those interested in a more detailed 
discussion of the deterrence versus attitude approaches to tax compliance behaviour they 
are directed to McKerchar, 2001). 
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While there is not room in this paper to discuss the many studies that have examined 
taxpayer attitudes over the years, for the purposes of the present article a handful of studies 
deserve particular mention. With respect to the tax system itself, there is specific evidence 
to suggest that perceptions of unfair tax burdens can affect taxpayers’ views about paying 
tax and can go on to affect their compliance decisions. According to Betty Jackson and 
Valerie Milliron, tax fairness seems to involve at least two different dimensions (Jackson 
& Milliron, 1986). The first relates to the benefits one receives for the tax dollars given. 
The second dimension involves the perceived equity of the taxpayer’s burden in reference 
to that of other individuals. This second dimension relates to taxpayers’ perceptions of the 
vertical equity of the tax system (see also Kinsey & Grasmick, 1993). If a taxpayer were to 
feel that they pay more than their fair share of tax when comparing themselves to wealthy 
taxpayers (that is, perceived vertical inequality), they are more likely to see paying tax as a 
burden than a taxpayer not concerned about these issues.  
 
In an experimental study, Spicer and Becker (1980) had participants make hypothetical tax 
evasion decisions. It was found that participants increased the amount of taxes evaded 
when they perceived themselves to be the victims of vertical inequity. It was also shown 
that they decreased the amount of tax evaded when they perceived themselves to be the 
beneficiaries of vertical inequity. Similarly, Kinsey and Grasmick (1993) found that 
changes in attitudes towards tax cheating were due in part to perceptions of increased 
vertical inequality in the US tax system over time.  
 
Research into procedural justice has also shown that taxpayers are generally more 
compliant when they think a tax authority has treated them fairly and respectfully (Wenzel, 
2003). For example, in a Swiss study, Feld and Frey (2002) presented empirical evidence 
to suggest that tax compliance increased when taxpayers were treated as trustworthy in the 
first instance by tax authorities. In a study of Australian taxpayers, Wenzel (2002) also 
studied the impact of justice perceptions, but this time on self-reported tax compliance. 
Using a survey methodology, Wenzel found that taxpayers were more compliant when 
they thought that they had been treated fairly and respectfully by the Tax Office. What the 
findings presented in this section suggest is that taxpayers’ attitudes towards the tax 
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system, and how they feel they have been treated by a tax authority, do play an important 
role in influencing their decision to comply or not. 
 
The present study 
 
To date, there has been little empirical research conducted on the attitudes and beliefs of 
taxpayers actually known to be engaged in aggressive tax planning (for the exceptions see 
Murphy, 2002a; 2002b; in press; Murphy & Byng, 2002a; 2002b; Hobson, 2002; Williams, 
2004). Most of the attitudinal studies in the tax arena have been limited to examining the 
attitudes and beliefs of taxpayers sampled from the general population. The reasons for this 
are twofold. First, there are difficulties associated with using self-reports of deviant 
behaviour. Due to fear of future retribution against them, few taxpayers engaged in illegal 
forms of tax avoidance are likely to fully admit to their non-compliant behaviour. In order 
to deal with this problem, many of the survey studies conducted have instead attempted to 
measure taxpayers’ propensity to evade or avoid tax (Wallschutzky, 1984; Wearing & 
Headey, 1997).  
 
Second, obtaining records of those taxpayers who have knowingly been involved in tax 
avoidance, either through aggressive or non-aggressive tax planning techniques is 
extremely difficult. Like all regulatory authorities in Australia, the Tax Office is bound by 
its obligations under the Australian Privacy Act 1988 and the Australian Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1936. The secrecy provisions set forth in the Acts prevent the Tax Office 
from disclosing the details of a taxpayers’ compliance record in all but the most general of 
circumstances. It is for this reason that studies using Tax Office data are not very common 
in the Australian tax compliance literature.  
 
What sets the present paper apart from other previous Australian tax studies of taxpayer 
attitudes is that it uses a large sample of taxpayers who have actually been accused by the 
Tax Office of engaging in aggressive tax planning to avoid tax1. This paper reports the 
findings of a research project that examines the beliefs, attitudes and motivations held by a 
                                                 
1 The reader should be reminded at this point that the term ‘aggressive tax planning’ in the context of the 
present article is used to refer to the strategies that the Tax Office refers to as tax avoidance behaviour. 
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national sample of tax scheme investors. Specific issues that will be examined are            
(a) scheme investors’ attitudes toward paying tax and whether these differ from views of 
the general population, (b) their views of the Australian tax system, and (c) their views of 
the Tax Office. This paper will also provide, for the first time in Australia, a demographic 
profile of those taxpayers who invested in mass-marketed tax schemes. While these 
findings will not be able to tell us definitively what motivated taxpayers to invest in 
aggressive tax planning schemes in the first place, it is hoped that they will be able to shed 
some light on why such a large number of tax scheme investors subsequently chose to 
resist the Tax Office’s attempts to recover their scheme related tax deductions. Before 
presenting the methodology used and the findings obtained from the present study, 
however, the history surrounding the mass-marketed tax scheme issue will first be 
discussed.  
 
A brief history surrounding the mass-marketed tax scheme issue 
 
In response to the increasing problem posed by aggressive tax planning during the 1990s, 
the Australian Commissioner of Taxation announced in 1998 that the Tax Office would be 
implementing a series of initiatives aimed at combating aggressive tax planning (Carmody, 
1998). Part of the Tax Office’s crackdown on aggressive tax planning involved issuing 
amended assessments to the 42 000 Australians who invested in mass marketed tax 
schemes during the 1990s. According to the Tax Office, many scheme participants’ 
investments were largely funded through tax deductions (relatively little private capital 
was at risk). The Tax Office believed that these schemes exploited loopholes in the law and 
were designed in such a way to illegally avoid tax (see Appendix A for a description of the 
schemes referred to in this paper). The anti-avoidance provisions of Part IVA of the 
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 were applied to scheme related investments and action 
was taken against investors to recover the tax owing.  
 
Investors, however, claimed that the schemes they invested in had been sold to them, 
sometimes by their accountants or financial planners, as a means by which they could 
legally minimise the tax they were required to pay while still being involved in a viable 
long-term investment (Senate Economics References Committee, 2001; Murphy, 2002a, 
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2003). Since investors believed they had done nothing wrong, the majority initially defied 
the Tax Office’s demands that they pay back scheme related tax debts (Murphy, 2002a; 
2002b). In fact, more than three years after amended assessments had first been issued in 
1998, fewer than 50 per cent of scheme investors had entered into settlement arrangements 
with the Tax Office to pay back their tax debts (see Murphy & Byng, 2002b).  
 
The schemes issue received wide media coverage in the late 1990s, and in 2000 the matter 
was referred to the Senate Economic References Committee for investigation. In response 
to both the continued resistance exhibited by investors, and the recommendations put forth 
by the Senate Economic References Committee, the Tax Office finally put forward a 
settlement offer in February 2002 whereby interest and culpability penalties would be 
waived for those scheme investors who could prove they had been the victims of 
aggressive marketing and bad advice. Investors were given until the end of June 2002 to 
make a decision about whether or not they would settle their scheme related debts under 
these terms, and as of 30 June 2002, only 5300 investors had not yet settled (Source: 
Australian Taxation Office, personal correspondence).  
 
Several Tax Office funded court cases relating to various tax schemes were also conducted 
in 2002. The three cases that were decided have all confirmed the Tax Office’s 
interpretation of the law—that scheme related tax deductions (see Appendix A) were not 
allowable (see Howland-Rose & Ors v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2002) FCA 
246, (2002) 49 ATR 206, 2002 ATC 4200; Puzey v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation 
(2002) FCA 1171, 50 ATR 595; Vincent v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2002) 
FCA 656, 50 ATR 20). These judgments confirm that the Tax Office’s opinion that mass 
marketed tax schemes are aggressive in nature, and exploit unintended loopholes in tax 
law, was warranted. However, while the courts may have agreed with the Tax Office’s 
opinion that tax schemes exploited deficiencies in tax law, knowing why scheme investors 
actively resisted the Tax Office’s attempts to recover tax owing is a little more difficult to 
ascertain. This study attempts to provide a partial answer to this important question.  
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Method 
 
Participants 
 
The data used to examine tax scheme participants’ views of the Australian tax system and 
of paying tax comes from The Australian Tax System Survey of Tax Scheme Investors 
(Murphy, 2002c). The 27-page survey was posted to a random sample of 6000 Australian 
tax scheme investors who had been selected from the Tax Office’s case files. A total of 
32 493 names and addresses were available for selection, and the sample of 6000 was 
drawn using probability proportional to size sampling within each state and territory in 
Australia (approximately 42 per cent of all scheme participants resided in Western 
Australia, so 2549 investors were randomly selected from this state)2.  
 
After repeated appeals for participation, 2301 completed surveys were received. When 
adjusted for out-of-scope taxpayers who had died, moved address, or who were incapable 
of completing a survey (N = 677), a response rate of 43 per cent was obtained. While 
appearing to be somewhat low, this response rate compares very well with experiences 
from other tax surveys conducted in Australia (Braithwaite et al., 2001; Wallschutzky, 
1984; 1996; Wenzel et al., 2003). Wallschutzky (1996) in fact argues that tax surveys of 
the general population cannot be expected to yield higher than a 30 to 40 per cent response 
rate. However, when one considers the resistance exhibited towards the Tax Office in 
relation to mass-marketed schemes, a response rate of 43 per cent in the present context 
was considered to be extremely successful3. 
 
Procedure 
 
Survey data were collected over a seven-month period between January and July 2002. The 
initial survey package was posted to each taxpayer in the sample and comprised a covering 
letter, the questionnaire and a reply-paid envelope. The covering letter explained the intent 
of the study, specifically that the researchers were interested in hearing from taxpayers 
whose tax assessments had been amended by the Tax Office. The letter also guaranteed 
                                                 
2 Due to privacy issues, the sampling was conducted by an Australian tax officer. 
3 Other more recent Australian tax surveys have yielded higher response rates than the present study (for 
example, McKerchar, 2002). However, it is unclear whether these high response rates were due to differences 
in the methodologies used or due to the length of the surveys used.  
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participants strict confidentiality of responses, and referred potential respondents to a free-
call number should they have any questions4.  
 
The follow-up of non-respondents after the first mailing was accomplished using an 
identification number attached to each questionnaire, which was in turn linked to the 
sample name at the Tax Office. In order to protect investors’ privacy, the Tax Office was 
responsible for all mailings of the survey and reminder letters. Investors who agreed to 
participate were asked to return their completed questionnaires in a reply-paid envelope to 
the Australian National University (ANU) for analysis. This procedure ensured that 
researchers at the ANU did not have access to the names or addresses of sampled investors. 
It also ensured that the Tax Office did not have access to individual taxpayers’ survey 
responses. A total of six mailings were made and by the end of July 2002, a total of 2301 
completed surveys had been received.  
 
Using the limited amount of demographic data available from the Tax Office’s case files 
(state of residence and sex)5, it was found that the sample of scheme investors who 
completed the survey was representative of the overall scheme investor population (for 
detailed information on the survey’s methodology see Murphy & Byng, 2002a). A 
regression analysis also revealed that there was no response bias from late respondents to 
the survey. Finally, upon examining the completed surveys it was found that sixteen 
respondents might have engaged in strategic answering of their surveys (that is, groups of 
respondents got together and answered the survey in exactly the same way, thus biasing 
their results). On closer inspection, nine of these surveys were chosen for deletion. Thus, 
the data analyses presented in this paper are based on only 2292 surveys.  
 
Findings 
 
The Investors’ Survey consisted of a number of different sections that were designed to 
assess tax scheme investors’ demographic profile, their attitudes and opinions towards the 
                                                 
4 It should be mentioned that a large number of phone calls were received from survey recipients expressing 
concern over the true motives of the survey. Some were worried that the information would be used against 
them by the Tax Office in court and were therefore reluctant to participate. 
5 It should be noted that this demographic data was provided to researchers in de-identified form only. 
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Australian tax system and paying tax, and their attitudes towards the Tax Office. This 
paper highlights some of the more interesting findings from each of these sections (for a 
summary of all findings from the Investor’s Survey see Murphy & Byng, 2002b).  
 
Throughout this paper, comparison data collected from taxpayers from the general 
population will also be presented. The purpose of this comparison will be to highlight 
important differences between taxpayers who engaged in aggressive tax planning and those 
who did not. The comparison data comes from a tax survey called the Community Hopes, 
Fears and Actions Survey that was conducted between June and October 2000 (Braithwaite 
et al., 2001). A total of 2040 completed questionnaires (29 per cent of those respondents 
who could be contacted) were received from this community survey6. The comparison 
between the two surveys was considered acceptable because the Investors’ Survey shared 
many questions in common with the Community Survey. 
 
Demographic profile of scheme investors 
 
A number of demographic variables have now been shown to affect levels of tax 
compliance or attitudes towards tax compliance. For example, a number of international 
studies have shown that those most likely to not comply with their tax obligations are male, 
are younger, are more educated, and earn more (for a review of this literature see Jackson 
& Milliron, 1986). The Investors’ Survey contained a number of socio-demographic 
questions designed to examine the profile of Australian taxpayers who invested in 
aggressive tax planning schemes.  
 
It was found that most of the respondents to the Investors’ Survey were male (82 per cent) 
and 17 per cent were female (1 per cent did not provide their sex). These figures were 
found to be representative of the overall scheme investor population (for the Community 
Survey, 47 per cent of all respondents were male and 53 per cent were female). The 
average age for both men and women responding to the Investors’ Survey was 46 years 
old, with men ranging from 24 to 76 years of age and women ranging from 25 to 81 years 
                                                 
6 A check on the Community Survey data revealed that 27 respondents reported having used tax schemes to 
minimise their tax. These taxpayers were excluded from the statistical analyses presented in this paper. 
 11
of age (the average age of respondents to the Community Survey was 48 years). Most of 
the respondents to the Investors’ Survey were found to be married or be in de facto 
relationships (82 per cent). Another 11 per cent had been married but were now divorced 
or separated, and 6 per cent had never been married. 72 per cent of the respondents were 
born in Australia whilst the remainders were born overseas. Of the 28 per cent of overseas-
born respondents, 40 per cent of these were from non-English speaking countries; 
primarily Malaysia, Germany, Italy, India and the Netherlands (76 per cent of respondents 
to the Community Survey were born in Australia). 
 
When examining labour force status it was found that most scheme investors were 
working—81 per cent worked full time and 8 per cent worked part time. 6 per cent were 
retired and the remaining 5 per cent were either unemployed, keeping house or studying. 
For those who did work either full-time or part-time, 58 per cent were privately employed, 
22 per cent were self-employed, in partnership or had their own business, 18 per cent 
worked for either local, state or the federal government, and 2 per cent worked in other 
non-profit organisations (for example, universities).  
 
Respondents to the Investors’ Survey were also found to be highly qualified, especially in 
comparison to Australia-wide education levels. Very few respondents had limited 
schooling, with less than 1 per cent indicating they had no schooling or only primary level. 
It was also found that 43 per cent held a bachelor degree or higher qualification (16 per 
cent had attained a postgraduate qualification). The figures from the Community Survey 
were 7 per cent, 24 per cent and 6 per cent respectively. Current income levels disclosed by 
scheme investors were also found to be very high. The average personal income was 
reported to be $73 000 and the average family income was reported to be $93 000 (this 
compares to $27 000 and $48 000 in the general population). These findings taken together 
are particularly interesting because many of the stories printed in the media over the years 
have highlighted the plight of scheme investors by indicating that they are Aussie battlers 
on average incomes trying to get ahead in life (Kalgoorlie Miner, 2001a; 2001b; The West 
Australian, 2001). The results from the Investors’ Survey instead suggest that scheme 
investors, as a group, are considerably wealthier and more educated than taxpayers from 
the general population. Given that scheme investors’ income and education levels were 
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found to be much higher than taxpayers from the general population, all of the remaining 
comparisons between the two taxpayer groups statistically controlled for the effects of 
these variables.  
 
Taxpayer attitudes towards the tax system 
 
As discussed in the Introduction section of this paper, a number of researchers have shown 
that taxpayers’ attitudes and beliefs about the tax system can affect their propensity to 
avoid tax. While there is no way of determining from the Investors’ Survey whether 
scheme investors’ attitudes and beliefs about the Australian tax system led them to become 
involved in aggressive tax planning schemes in the first place, the survey results can tell us 
how investors’ now view the tax system and the Tax Office, especially after having had 
action taken against them by the Tax Office. These post-event views can also give an 
insight into why such a large number of scheme investors actively resisted the Tax Office’s 
attempts to recover their scheme related tax debts (all scales used in this paper can be 
found in Appendix B)7.  
 
Of particular interest was whether perceptions of vertical inequity were higher among 
scheme investors than the general population, and whether investors thought the tax-
funded benefits they received were inadequate based on the amount of tax they paid each 
year. Perception of vertical inequity was measured by asking survey respondents to rate the 
extent to which 16 societal groups paid their fair share of tax. These 16 groups included 
high status (for example, doctors and judges), middle status (for example, small business 
owners) and low status (for example, factory workers) occupational groups. Following a 
procedure used by Wenzel (2002), a standard deviation over these ratings was calculated 
for each survey respondent. A higher standard deviation on this measure indicates a larger 
difference in perceived vertical inequality. When examining the mean of all standard 
deviation scores it was found that perceived vertical inequality was higher among scheme 
investors (M = 1.07, SD = 0.41) than taxpayers from the general population (M = 1.01,   
                                                 
7 Given the number of statistical tests conducted in this paper, an adjustment to the alpha level was used 
within each section of the results to control for inflations in Type I error rates. Thus, the resulting alpha level 
used to assess taxpayers’ attitudes towards the tax system and paying tax was 0.01, and for attitudes towards 
the Tax Office it was 0.004. 
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SD = 0.44). After statistically controlling for the effects of family income and education 
levels, this difference was still found to be significant, F(1, 3891) = 16.20, p < 0.001.  
 
A two-item scale was then measured to assess whether survey respondents thought they 
themselves paid their fair share of tax (scores out of 5; 1 = much more to 5 = much less). 
Again, after controlling for income and education level, it was found that scheme investors 
as a group (M = 2.25, SD = 0.77) were significantly more likely to think they paid more 
than their fair share of tax than taxpayers from the general population (M = 2.61, SD = 
0.71; F(1, 3866) = 82.90, p < 0.001).  
 
Perceived unfairness in the tax system was also measured using a third item that was 
designed to ask taxpayers whether they thought the tax they paid was fair given the goods 
and services they received from the government. Scheme investors were found to score 
significantly lower on this measure (M = 2.44, SD = 1.17) than taxpayers from the general 
population (M = 2.79, SD = 1.13; F(1, 3914) = 54.90, p < 0.001), indicating that scheme 
investors were still more likely to think the tax they paid was unfair given the goods and 
services they received.  
 
These three findings taken together indicate that scheme investors, in comparison to 
taxpayers from the general population, are more likely to view the tax system as an unfair 
system. While the reader may be thinking at this stage that these findings are not 
unexpected given the income level of scheme investors, it should be noted that even when 
income level and education level were statistically controlled for across groups, scheme 
investors as a group were more dissatisfied with the tax system than even wealthy or 
highly educated taxpayers from the general population.  
 
Taxpayer attitudes towards paying tax 
 
Scheme investors’ actual views about paying tax were also assessed using two scales. The 
first scale was modeled on Sutton’s (1997) material loss index (see Appendix B). This 
index was designed to ask taxpayers how they felt about paying tax and whether they 
believed paying tax removed the incentive to earn more income. It was found that scheme 
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investors were somewhat negative in their opinion towards paying tax (M = 3.23, SD = 
1.05) as their mean score fell slightly above the midpoint on the 1 to 5 scale. Further, 
scheme investors’ negativity towards paying tax was more extreme than the negativity 
exhibited by taxpayers from the general population (M = 3.08, SD = 0.87). Even after 
controlling for income and education levels between the two taxpayer groups, this 
difference was found to be statistically significant, F(1, 3889) = 58.61, p < 0.001. 
Taxpayers’ commitment towards paying tax was assessed via a second scale. Taxpayers 
scoring high on the 8-item commitment scale (scores range from 1 to 5) were more likely 
to feel a sense of moral obligation towards paying their taxes. While scheme investors 
appeared to be committed to paying tax in their own right (M = 3.75, SD = 0.48), it was 
found that taxpayers from the general population (M = 3.85, SD = 0.54) were significantly 
more committed to paying tax, F(1, 3928) = 64.73, p < 0.001. This was the case even after 
controlling for their income and education levels. 
 
Taxpayers’ views about the equity and fairness of the tax system were then correlated with 
their views about paying tax. As can be seen in Table 1, views about the unfairness of the 
tax system were significantly correlated with taxpayers’ views about paying tax; this was 
the case for both scheme investors and the general population. In particular, those 
taxpayers who were more likely to perceive the vertical inequity in the tax system to be 
great, to think they were paying more than their fair share of tax, or who were more likely 
to think the goods and services they received for their tax dollars were inadequate, were 
less committed to paying tax. Likewise, they were also more likely to think paying tax 
removed the incentive to earn more income. Not surprisingly, these findings clearly 
suggest that there is a direct link between one’s views about the fairness of the tax system 
and views about paying tax.  
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Table 1: Correlations between taxpayers’ views about the fairness of the tax system 
and their views about paying tax 
 
 Views towards paying tax 
 Scheme Investors General Population 
Perceived fairness of 
the tax system 
Commitment 
to paying tax
Paying tax 
is seen as a 
material loss
Commitment to 
paying tax 
Paying tax is 
seen as a 
material loss 
Vertical inequity -0.06** 0.28** -0.07** 0.22** 
Does taxpayer feel 
they pay fair share of 
tax 
0.15** -0.34** 0.21** -0.24** 
Goods & Services fair 
for tax dollars given? 
0.27** -0.41** 0.34** -0.38** 
*p < 0.01; **p < 0.001 
 
 
Taxpayer attitudes towards the Tax Office 
 
The previous two sections examined taxpayers’ views about both the tax system and 
paying tax. Given the long-standing dispute between the Tax Office and scheme investors, 
this section examines taxpayers’ attitudes and views towards the Tax Office itself. Of 
specific interest were scheme investors’ perceptions of the procedural fairness aspects of 
their encounter with the Tax Office. These views were considered to be particularly 
important because negative views of an organisation’s procedures are often associated with 
a decline in institutional trust, perceived power, and perceived legitimacy of that 
organisation8.  
 
Procedural Fairness  
 
As discussed earlier, the Tax Office experienced a great deal of hostility and resistance 
from scheme investors, with the majority of investors refusing to pay back their tax debts 
for several years. Of particular interest to the present study was why investors may have 
reacted in such a negative way towards the Tax Office. A number of researchers (Murphy, 
2002a, 2002b; 2003; Tyler, 1990) have shown that when people evaluate authorities they 
often refer to the procedural justice aspects of their encounter with that authority when 
                                                 
8 Legitimacy is ‘the judgement that authorities are competent and honest, and that their professional role 
entitles them to make decisions which ought to be deferred to and obeyed’ (Tyler, 1998, p. 273). 
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making judgments; if they feel they have been treated poorly by an authority, people are 
likely to judge the procedural justice aspects of their encounter as unfair. Alternatively, if 
they feel they have been treated well by an authority, people are likely to judge the 
procedural justice aspects of their encounter as fair. This is the case even if a decision is 
made that goes against the citizen’s own interests (Tyler, 1990). Three multi-item scales 
adapted from Tom Tyler’s research were used in the Investors’ Survey to measure the 
importance of procedural justice perceptions in the context of the scheme’s situation 
(Tyler, 1997). These scales were labeled ‘ATO is fair’, ‘neutrality’, and ‘respect’. The 
‘ATO is fair’ scale was designed to assess whether taxpayers believed the Tax Office 
considers the concerns of average citizens and tries to be fair when making their decisions. 
The ‘neutrality’ scale measured whether taxpayers believed the Tax Office is impartial 
when making decisions, and the ‘respect’ scale assessed whether taxpayers thought the Tax 
Office treated them with respect and dignity. Also measured were two additional 
procedural justice scales designed by Braithwaite and Makkai (1994). They were ‘ATO 
engagement in the consultation process’, and ‘the degree to which the ATO communicates 
to taxpayers that they consider them trustworthy’. Once again, all scores on these five 
scales ranged from 1 to 5. 
 
As can be seen in Table 2 the Tax Office was rated below the midpoint on all but one of 
the measures of procedural justice. When comparing all of the figures with those from the 
Community Survey—and after controlling for income and education levels—it can be seen 
that scheme investors were significantly more critical of the Tax Office on all procedural 
justice measures than taxpayers from the general population. According to scheme 
investors, the Tax Office performed particularly poorly on the consultation measure, 
suggesting that the Tax Office did not appear to consult widely with taxpayers involved in 
schemes before issuing amended assessments9.  
 
 
 
                                                 
9 In this regard, investors appear to be unaware of the extensive consultation that the Tax Office had 
undertaken with the promoters and advisers who represented investors.  
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Institutional trust 
 
Taxpayers’ level of trust in the Tax Office was measured through an eight-item scale 
(Braithwaite & Reinhart, 2001). Scores on the scale ranged from 1 to 5, with a high score 
indicating greater levels of trust in the operations and behaviour of the Tax Office. The 
scale incorporated items such as whether respondents thought the Tax Office could be 
trusted to administer the tax system fairly, whether it met its obligations to Australians and 
whether it took advantage of people who were vulnerable. It was found that scheme 
investors were somewhat distrusting of the Tax Office (M = 2.41, SD = 0.68) as their mean 
score fell slightly below the midpoint on the 1 to 5 scale. Scheme investors’ trust in the 
Tax Office was also found to be lower than the trust exhibited by taxpayers from the 
general population (M = 3.17, SD = 0.65). After controlling for income and education 
levels, this difference was still found to be statistically significant, F(1, 3920) = 721.37,     
p < 0.001. In order to evaluate whether this decrease in trust was a direct result of the Tax 
Office having taken action against them in relation to their scheme related investments, 
scheme investors were asked the following question: ‘As a result of your amended tax 
return, do you have more or less trust in the Tax Office?’ 90 per cent of all investors 
surveyed claimed they now had less trust in the Tax Office as a result of having their tax 
returns amended10.  
 
Perceived power 
 
The perceived power of the Tax Office was also measured through two multi-item scales. 
The first scale represents the degree to which the Tax Office is seen as being powerful in 
its capacity to regulate small business, wage and salary earners, and self-employed 
individuals who defy it. The second scale represents the Tax Office’s capacity to use 
power to bring large businesses and high wealth individuals back into line. Both scales 
again ranged from 1 to 5, with higher scores reflecting higher perceived levels of power. It 
was found that scheme investors as a group thought the Tax Office had a lot of power in 
dealing with small business/wage and salary earners who defied them (M = 4.35, 
                                                 
10 In an in-depth analysis of these variables, I have shown in an earlier paper that the decrease in trust among 
scheme investors was a direct result of the Tax Office’s procedures being perceived to be procedurally unjust 
(see Murphy, in press; see also Murphy, 2002b). I also argued that this decrease in trust resulted in the 
widespread resistance exhibited by tax scheme investors towards the Tax Office. 
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SD = 0.57) but were sceptical about the Tax Office’s power to regulate defiant large 
businesses or wealthy individuals (M = 2.85, SD = 1.21). In contrast, after controlling for 
income and education levels, taxpayers from the general population were significantly less 
likely to think the Tax Office had a lot of power to deal with small business owners and 
wage and salary earners (M = 4.11, SD = 0.67; F(1, 3917) = 42.78, p < 0.001). Taxpayers 
from the general population were also significantly more likely to think the Tax Office had 
power to regulate large business or wealthy individuals who defied them (M = 3.15, SD = 
1.21; F(1, 3914) = 42.42, p < 0.001). These findings again support the notion that 
perceived inequity in the tax system is higher among scheme investors because they are 
more likely to think the rich get away with not paying their fair share of tax. This 
perception was despite the fact that scheme investors were relatively high-income earners 
themselves. 
 
Legitimacy 
 
Within political psychology, procedural justice is widely hypothesized to be an antecedent 
of legitimacy. Researchers have argued that people who feel they have been fairly treated 
by an authority, regard their authority status as more legitimate (Tyler, 1997; Tyler & Lind, 
1992). It has also been shown that if an organisation is perceived to be legitimate, people 
are generally more likely to follow and accept their decisions (Tyler, 1997). Two measures 
of legitimacy were assessed in the Investors’ Survey. The two measures were taxpayers’ 
‘obligation to accept ATO decisions’ and their ‘evaluation of the ATO’. These two multi-
item scales were designed to specifically assess the perceived legitimacy of the Tax Office. 
As can be seen in Table 2, scheme investors strongly questioned the legitimacy of the Tax 
Office (indicated by low scores on the two measures). They also questioned the legitimacy 
of the Tax Office more so than taxpayers from the general population. These findings 
support Tom Tyler’s work that has shown that people who feel they have been unfairly 
treated by an authority will regard that organisations’ authority status as less legitimate, 
and subsequently, will be less likely to follow that organisation’s rules and decisions 
(Tyler, 1997).  
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In summary, what all of the findings of the present section tell us is that regulators will 
need to acknowledge the importance of procedural justice in their dealings with taxpayers 
or else run the risk of undermining levels of trust in the community, undermining their own 
power, and undermining their legitimacy. The risk of this occurring is that it could lead to 
widespread resistance among those being regulated.  
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Table 2: Respondents’ mean scores on procedural fairness and legitimacy scales. 
Standard deviations are presented in brackets 
 
Scales 
 
Scheme 
Investors 
General 
Population 
Procedural Fairness   
 Tax Office is fair* 2.14 (0.78) 3.04 (0.76) 
 Neutrality* 2.48 (0.75) 3.26 (0.67) 
 Respect* 3.13 (0.52) 3.23 (0.82) 
 Trustworthy treatment from the ATO* 2.37 (0.88) 3.19 (0.79) 
 Consultation* 1.98 (0.66) 2.68 (0.71) 
Legitimacy   
 Evaluation of the ATO* 2.03 (0.69) 2.74 (0.67) 
 Obligation to accept ATO decisions* 1.98 (0.83) 2.67 (0.83) 
Scale range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree); * means difference between groups is 
statistically significant at the p < 0.001 level, even after controlling for income and educational differences 
between the groups. 
 
 
General discussion 
 
The aim of this paper has been to provide the reader with an insight into how taxpayers 
involved in aggressive tax planning now see and view the Australian tax system, the Tax 
Office and paying tax. Using data collected from a large-scale survey of tax scheme 
investors, it has been shown that those who engaged in aggressive tax planning schemes 
during the 1990s are more highly educated and earn significantly more than taxpayers from 
the general population. Further, they are more disillusioned with the tax system, are more 
likely to resent paying tax, and are more hostile and resistant towards the Tax Office. The 
following sections discuss the implications these findings have for both policy initiatives in 
the tax context and for the deterrence theory of non-compliance.  
 
Policy implications 
 
The rise and fall of aggressive tax planning 
 
Although not presented in the Findings section of this paper, the Investors’ Survey 
revealed that 94 per cent of tax scheme investors said they would no longer consider 
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investing in a tax scheme that did not have a valid Product Ruling11 from the Tax Office to 
say it was legitimate. Further, 52 per cent of respondents indicated that they would be less 
prepared to go in for a scheme that relied for its success on loopholes in the law. These two 
figures suggest that the Tax Office’s moves to discourage future marketing and investment 
in such arrangements have been somewhat effective. For example, the findings specifically 
suggest that former scheme investors are using the Tax Office’s Product Ruling system. 
Whether this is true for Australian investors in general is yet to be seen.  
 
One point that should be noted, however, is that these findings do not suggest that 
involvement in aggressive tax planning has been stemmed altogether. As the 
Commissioner of Taxation recently stated in a newspaper interview, ‘Despite some 
positive signs, and the apparent demise of the 90s-style mass marketed schemes, it would 
be wrong to proclaim the death of aggressive tax planning’ (Marris, 2002). It has been well 
documented that aggressive tax planning has been around for many decades (Braithwaite, 
in press; Levi, 1988) and while the general anti-avoidance legislation may have recently 
gone someway to stemming the problem of aggressive tax planning—at least in relation to 
tax schemes—it does not appear to have gone far enough. It is proposed here that a whole 
of government approach is needed to come to grips with the problem. Suggestions for how 
this could be done are presented below (Braithwaite, in press). 
 
As noted in the Introduction to this paper, most scheme investors claim they got the idea to 
invest in tax schemes from financial advisers and tax professionals (for empirical data see 
Murphy & Byng, 2002b). Results from a number of other studies have also pointed to 
lower compliance and more aggressive avoidance strategies among taxpayers who use tax 
preparers (Erard, 1993; Klepper & Nagain, 1989). Further, recent reports (Marris, 2002) 
indicate that foreign tax havens are now replacing mass-marketed schemes as the leading 
tax avoidance method ‘being pushed by aggressive tax agents’ (in fact, recent international 
estimates put the total funds being invested in foreign tax havens at $6 trillion; Edwards, 
1998). These findings clearly suggest that more needs to be done to regulate those who 
                                                 
11 Product Rulings are intended to provide certainty for potential investors by confirming the tax benefits of 
the investment. They apply to all participants in an investment. A Product Ruling only applies, however, if 
the arrangement is carried out in accordance with the information provided to the Tax Office. 
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possess the expertise to assist clients in exploiting opportunities for tax non-compliance. 
Formal guidelines and accreditation procedures that aim to protect taxpayers from advisers 
who (1) may misinterpret their clients’ wishes, or (2) lack the ability or integrity to prepare 
accurate and correct tax returns, may go a long way to stemming aggressive tax planning in 
general. Moves to further regulate the advice given by financial advisers would also be 
prudent (Australian Securities and Investment Commission, 2003) and, so too would 
moves to amend legislation to introduce financial penalties for the promoters and 
marketers of aggressive tax planning schemes (Braithwaite, in press). These moves are 
deemed necessary because without placing some onus of responsibility on the promoters, 
financial advisers or even the professionals who assist taxpayers to prepare their tax 
returns, aggressive tax planning will continue to evolve and flourish in the future; this can 
already be seen by the recent rise in ordinary Australians becoming involved in foreign tax 
havens (Carmody, 2002).  
 
Luckily, there are indications that moves such as those proposed above are already being 
considered by government. For example, the Financial Services Reform Act 2001, which 
will become fully effective in March 2004, aims to impose more stringent rules by which 
financial planners must abide. The Commissioner of Taxation also recently indicated that a 
move to introduce promoter penalties would be considered so as to protect taxpayers from 
becoming the future victims of unscrupulous tax scheme promoters (the Commissioners’ 
proposal is currently awaiting government consideration). Not only is it proposed that 
these moves will have an impact on aggressive tax planning, but they will also go on to 
improve both the integrity of Australia’s tax system and citizen confidence in the Tax 
Office.  
 
Theoretical implications 
 
Findings from the Investors’ Survey can also inform us about whether traditional 
enforcement strategies used by tax authorities are effective in gaining compliance. Not 
surprisingly, the deterrence theory framework has significantly influenced the style of 
enforcement used by most tax authorities around the world. As discussed in the 
introduction to this paper, deterrence theories see taxpayers as being motivated purely by 
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rational costs and opportunities. Advocates of the deterrence view therefore believe that 
harsh sanctions, penalties and legal coercion should be used when dealing with non-
compliant taxpayers. The situation surrounding the mass-marketed schemes issue, 
however, demonstrates that the use of such a deterrence based strategy—in addition to 
being more expensive to implement—can actually be counter-productive (Ayres & 
Braithwaite, 1992; Bardach & Kagan, 1982; Braithwaite, 2002; Hawkins, 1990). In 
particular, the Tax Office’s initial use of a punitive deterrence-based strategy with 42 000 
tax scheme investors appeared to produce the opposite behaviour from that sought. Instead 
of complying, the majority of tax scheme investors actively resisted the Tax Office’s 
attempts to recover tax owing on their scheme related tax debts.  
 
Using in-depth interview data from 29 scheme investors, Murphy (2003; see also 2002a) 
argued that this widespread resistance was a direct result of the Tax Office’s initial 
enforcement strategy with investors being perceived to be procedurally unfair. Perceptions 
of unfair treatment were also expressed by the 2292 scheme investors surveyed in the 
present study (see Table 2). When compared to taxpayers from the general population, it 
was found that scheme investors were more critical of the procedural fairness aspects of 
Tax Office encounters, and as a result they were less trusting of the Tax Office, were more 
likely to question the power of the Tax Office, and were more likely to question the 
legitimacy of the organisation. Further, it was found that investors were less committed to 
paying tax, were much more likely to believe paying tax removed the incentive to earn 
more income and were more likely to see vertical inequity in the tax system (this was even 
the case when their income and education levels were controlled for). These findings taken 
together suggest that perceptions of unfair treatment can go on to affect a person’s 
subsequent views and behaviour. In the case of scheme investors, the Tax Office’s 
handling of the schemes issue appears to have led to widespread taxpayer resistance 
against their decisions and procedures.  
 
The findings presented in this paper also suggest that a theory of compliance that is based 
purely on deterrence is unlikely to tell us with much confidence whether a taxpayer will 
comply willingly with a regulator’s decisions. If it did, then we would have expected to see 
the majority of scheme investors agreeing to settle their tax debts when the Tax Office first 
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took action against them in 1998. It is therefore proposed here that regulatory agencies 
such as the Tax Office will need to acknowledge the importance of procedural justice in 
their dealings with taxpayers if they wish to avoid widespread resistance against their 
decisions. One obvious and practical way this can be achieved in the Tax Office is for 
management to encourage staff that deal with taxpayers to genuinely adopt the principles 
underlying the ATO Compliance Model.  
 
The ATO Compliance Model—only introduced into the Tax Office in 1998—aims to 
incorporate many of the key features of procedural justice. The style of enforcement 
emphasised in the Model is to first take into account the problems, motivations, and 
conditions behind non-compliance (Braithwaite & Braithwaite, 2001; Hobson, 2003; Job & 
Honaker, 2003; Murphy, 2003b). The Model suggests that taxpayers should initially be 
given the benefit of the doubt and the Tax Office’s trust in their honesty should be brought 
to the foreground of a regulatory encounter. Strong emphasis should be placed on 
educating taxpayers about rules and assisting them in efforts to comply, while programs 
that rely principally on threats and the mechanical imposition of penalties should be de-
emphasized (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992; Braithwaite, 2002). It is only when taxpayers 
then continue to be uncooperative that more interventionist strategies (for example, more 
severe sanctions) should be considered.  
 
While only in its infancy, the evidence to support the effectiveness of this style of 
‘responsive’ regulation is growing. For example, in a study of compliance with Australian 
nursing home care standards, researchers found that when facility managers felt that 
inspectors were cooperative and trusting of them in the first instance, rather than 
accusatory and coercive, compliance increased (Braithwaite & Makkai, 1994). In another 
study, Scholz (1991) found that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration in the 
US could increase the effectiveness of their regulatory enforcement by initially 
administering less stringent sanctions and penalties. The empirical evidence collected by 
the Investors’ Survey also suggests that if the Tax Office had have made an earlier 
commitment to implement the principles underlying the Compliance Model in the schemes 
situation, then they may have achieved a more effective compliance outcome.  
 
 25
Conclusion 
 
While this paper did not directly assess what motivated scheme investors to become 
involved in aggressive tax planning in the first place12, it has attempted to provide the 
reader with a broader understanding of how citizens may react towards a regulatory 
authority who accuses them of purposefully breaking the law. The results have specifically 
demonstrated that the beliefs and attitudes held by a national sample of tax scheme 
participants differ substantially from those of the general population. In particular, it was 
found that scheme investors were more critical of the Australian tax system, the Tax Office 
and of paying tax.  
 
These findings have direct implications for any regulatory authority charged with 
enforcing citizen compliance with the law. What the findings specifically tell us is that 
regulators will need to move beyond enforcement strategies linked purely to deterrence if 
they wish to avoid widespread resistance against their procedures. It is suggested here that 
regulatory authorities who deal with non-compliers will instead need to move towards a 
more responsive strategy that takes into account the fact that sometimes people are 
motivated by costs and benefits, but that at other times they are motivated by a sense of 
social responsibility. In this way, regulators will be more likely to nurture the good will of 
those with a commitment to compliance, while still having the ability to escalate to more 
interventionist forms of regulation if abuse of trust occurs and persists (see also Murphy, 
2002b).  
 
In making these conclusions, however, it is acknowledged that the present study certainly 
has its limitations, mainly due to its survey methodology. There is a sense among non-
social scientists in particular that self-report methods of recording attitudes and behaviour 
are untrustworthy, especially when the information sought is sensitive, potentially 
incriminating or embarrassing (Hessing, Elffers & Weigel, 1988). For example, in the case 
of scheme investors, it is possible that survey respondents may have exaggerated 
perceptions of unfair treatment by the Tax Office in order to bring more attention to their 
                                                 
12 For those interested in this topic they are directed to Murphy, 2002a, 2003; Hobson, 2002. 
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cause13. Thus, wherever the present paper findings were put in terms of causal 
directionality (for example, that the Tax Office’s unfair procedures caused widespread 
resistance), such interpretations stemmed from the underlying theory used. When 
considering the findings in this context, the study therefore yielded some significant and 
instructive findings.  
 
                                                 
13 The Tax Office’s final settlement offer had not been presented to investors at the time that this survey first 
went into the field in January 2002. 
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Appendix A 
 
To date, three categories of mass marketed schemes operating in the Australian market 
have been identified by the Tax Office (Australian Taxation Office, 2000). These include, 
(1) round-robin schemes, including non-recourse financing, often in agriculture, 
afforestation and franchises; (2) certain film schemes, with guaranteed returns that are, in 
effect, a return of part of the invested funds; and (3) employee benefit arrangements that 
have tax benefits as their main purpose. It is only the first two types of scheme that are of 
relevance to the present study. 
 
An example of a franchise scheme is ‘Oracle’. Oracle offered investors the opportunity to 
invest in a business that promoted and presented personal development and educational 
workshops. By making an initial cash outlay of $10 000 and borrowing $30 000 from 
Oracle’s financing company, investors could claim an immediate tax deduction of $40 000. 
This would therefore lead to some investors, depending on their original income level, to 
receive a tax refund from the Tax Office of up to $19 400 (Source: Oracle International Pty 
Ltd Prospectus, p. 3). From here, $10 000 of the $19 400 went into paying the initial 
$10 000 set up fee. In some cases, investors were therefore able to pocket the remaining 
$9400.  
 
Several aspects of the investment were of concern to the Tax Office. One major concern 
was that the loan of $30 000 was repayable only from the proceeds of the business. If the 
business made no profit investors would not be required to repay the loan. Therefore, 
unlike many other investments (for example, negative gearing of property), there was no 
risk to the investor. In addition, some scheme investors made a profit from their tax return 
(in some cases the profit was as high as $9400). Another concern for the Tax Office related 
to the nature of the deduction made. Specifically, only a fraction of the $40 000 claimed as 
a tax deduction went into the underlying activity. For many scheme arrangements, the 
majority of the money raised went into financing the management fees. 
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Appendix B 
 
Below is a complete list of the items used for the various scales presented throughout the 
paper. The list also details the original scale formats and the recoding of the data if 
applicable. 
 
Views about the tax system 
 
Vertical inequity 
 
‘In your opinion, do the following groups pay their fair share of tax?’ (1 = pay much more, 
2 = pay a bit more, 3 = pay about their fair share, 4 = pay a bit less, 5 = pay much less):  
(1) workers whose primary income is wage and salaries; (2) families earning less than 
$20 000 a year; (3) unskilled factory workers; (4) trades people; (5) farm labourers;         
(6) waitresses; (7) farm owners; (8) small business owners; (9) families earning more than 
$100 000 a year; (10) owner-managers of large companies; (11) senior judges and 
barristers; (12) doctors in general practice (GPs); (13) chief executives of large national 
corporations; (14) tax agents and advisers; (15) surgeons; and (16) people who make a lot 
of money from investments. 
 
Does taxpayer feel they themselves pay their fair share of tax? 
 
‘In your opinion, do the following groups pay their fair share of tax?’ (1 = pay much more, 
2 = pay a bit more, 3 = pay about their fair share, 4 = pay a bit less, 5 = pay much less):  
(1) you, yourself; (2) your industry/occupation group. 
 
Goods and services fair for tax dollars given 
 
‘Do you think that the tax you pay is fair given the goods and services you get from the 
government?’ (1 = No!!, 2 = No, 3 = ?, 4 = Yes, 5 = Yes!!).  
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Views about paying tax 
 
Paying tax seen as a material loss 
 
‘I would be better off if I worked less given the rate at which I am taxed’; ‘Paying tax 
removes the incentive to earn more income’; ‘Paying tax means I just can’t get ahead’      
(1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree). 
 
Commitment to paying tax 
 
‘I feel a moral obligation to pay my tax’; ‘Overall, I pay my tax with good will’; ‘I resent 
paying tax’ (reverse coded); ‘I accept responsibility for paying my fair share of tax’;         
‘I think of taxpaying as helping the government do worthwhile things’; ‘Paying tax is the 
right thing to do’; ‘Paying tax is a responsibility that should be willingly accepted by all 
Australians’; ‘Paying my tax ultimately advantages everyone’ (1 = strongly disagree,         
2 = disagree, 3 = neither, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree). 
 
Attitudes towards the Tax Office 
 
Institutional trust 
 
The ATO; ‘ has misled the Australian people’ (reverse coded); ‘acted in the interests of all 
Australians’; ‘turned its back on its responsibility to Australians’ (reverse coded); ‘caved 
into pressure from special interest groups’ (reverse coded); ‘is trusted by you to administer 
the tax system fairly’; ‘takes advantage of people who are vulnerable’ (reverse coded); 
‘meets its obligations to Australians’; ‘is open and honest in its dealings with citizens’      
(1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree). 
 
Power to regulate small business and wage & salary earners 
 
‘The Tax Office can’t do much if a small business decides to defy it’ (reverse coded); ‘The 
Tax Office can’t do much if an ordinary wage and salary earner decides to defy it’ (reverse 
coded); The Tax Office can’t do much if a self-employed taxpayer decides to defy it’ 
(reverse coded) (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly 
agree). 
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Power to regulate large business and high wealth individuals 
 
‘The Tax Office can’t do much if a large company decides to defy it’ (reverse coded); ‘The 
Tax Office can’t do much if a wealthy individual decides to defy it’ (reverse coded)          
(1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree). 
 
Procedural justice 
 
ATO is fair 
 
‘The Tax Office considers the concerns of average citizens when making decisions’; ‘The 
Tax Office cares about the position of taxpayers’; ‘The Tax Office tries to be fair when 
making their decisions’; (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither, 4 = agree,           
5 = strongly agree). 
 
Respect 
 
‘The Tax Office respects the individual’s rights as a citizen’; The Tax Office is concerned 
about protecting the average citizen’s rights’ (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree,               
3 = neither, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree). 
 
Neutrality 
 
‘The Tax Office gives equal consideration to the views of all Australians’; ‘The Tax Office 
gets the kind of information it needs to make informed decisions’; ‘The Tax Office is 
generally honest in the way it deals with people’ (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree,         
3 = neither, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree). 
 
Consultation 
 
‘The Tax Office listens to powerful interest groups, not to ordinary Australians’ (reverse 
coded); ‘ The Tax Office is more concerned about making their own job easier than 
making it easier for taxpayers’ (reverse coded); ‘The Tax Office consults widely about 
how they might change things to make it easier for taxpayers to meet their obligations’; 
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‘The Tax Office goes to great lengths to consult with the community over changes to their 
system’ (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree). 
 
Trustworthy treatment from the Tax Office 
 
‘The Tax Office treats people as if they can be trusted to do the right thing’; ‘The Tax 
Office treats people as if they will only do the right thing when forced to’ (reverse coded) 
(1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree). 
 
Legitimacy 
 
Obligation to accept and follow decisions 
 
‘People should follow the decisions of the Tax Office even if they go against what they 
think is right’; ‘I should accept decisions made by the Tax Office even when I disagree 
with them’ (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree). 
 
Favourable evaluation of the Tax Office 
 
‘The Tax Office has too much power’ (reverse coded); ‘The Tax Office’s decisions are too 
influenced by political pressures’ (reverse coded); ‘The Tax Office does its job well’        
(1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree). 
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